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Joseph M. Yablonski, Esq. (Argued) 
Yablonski, Costello & Leckie, P.C. 
505 Washington Trust Building 
30 East Beau Street 
Washington, PA 15301 
   Counsel for Appellant 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge 
 
Ernest Thomas Harris appeals the 120-month sentence 
that the district court imposed on him following his nolo 
contendere plea for possession of a firearm by a felon in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Harris claims that his 
sentence was substantively and procedurally flawed. The 
primary contention that he raises, one of first impression for 
this Court, is whether one who pleads nolo contendere to an 
offense is thereby ineligible for a reduction in the offense 
level for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 
3E1.1. Although we hold that a nolo contendere plea does not 
automatically preclude a district court from granting such a 
reduction,   we will nevertheless, affirm the sentence.   
 
I. 
 
On May 31, 2011, Harris consumed large amounts of 
drugs and alcohol from about 4:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. in 
celebration of his birthday.  He continued his celebration by 
meeting some friends at a bar in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  At 
some point after arriving at the bar, Harris brandished a gun 
several times as he walked around the bar, sometimes 
swaying from side to side.  His actions were recorded by the 
bar’s video cameras.  In response, two patrons inside the bar 
called 911 and identified Harris as the man who was 
brandishing the gun.   
 
When Officer Raymond Perry arrived on the scene, 
Harris was standing outside of the bar with the gun in his 
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hand.  With the help of other officers, Officer Perry arrested 
Harris and seized the gun.  Officer Perry testified that Harris 
uttered nonsensical things to the officers as they arrested him.  
Officer Perry concluded that Harris was highly intoxicated, 
and the officers declined to interview him at that time.   
 
On August 24, 2011, a federal grand jury returned a 
two-count indictment against Harris charging him with 
unlawful possession of ammunition (Count One), and 
unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 
Two).   
 
On December 20, 2011, the district court held a change 
of plea hearing to determine whether Harris could plead nolo 
contendere to Count Two.1 During the hearing, Harris 
testified that, on the night in question, he was so intoxicated 
that he did not remember anything after he arrived at the bar.  
Officer Perry testified that Harris uttered strange things to 
him during the arrest and was too intoxicated to be 
interviewed. The district court also watched the video 
recording made by the bar’s camera that night, and Harris 
admitted he was the man in the video with the gun.     
 
At the end of this hearing, the government agreed that 
Harris probably did not remember the events from that night 
and suggested that the district court accept the nolo 
contendere plea.  The district court agreed with the 
government that Harris was too intoxicated to remember the 
details of that night, and concluded that a nolo contendere 
plea was appropriate on Count Two.    
 
The district court thereafter accepted the plea and 
subsequently sentenced Harris to the statutory maximum of 
120-months imprisonment on Count Two.  His base offense 
level for violating § 922(g)(1) was 24; he received a 4-level 
increase for possessing a firearm in connection with another 
felony; and he incurred a 2-level increase for possessing a 
stolen firearm.  The district court denied Harris’s requests for 
a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under 
                                              
1 Harris pleaded not guilty to Count One and was 
subsequently acquitted after a three day trial.  
 
 4 
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 and a downward variance based on his 
mental health history.  With a base offense level of 30 and a 
criminal history category of IV, his advisory sentencing 
Guidelines range was 135 to 168 months.  The district court 
reduced this sentence to the statutory maximum of 120 
months.   
 
II. 
  Harris argues the district court erred in rejecting his 
request for a U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility.  We review a district court’s determination of 
whether the defendant is entitled to an acceptance of 
responsibility under reduction for clear error.  United States v. 
Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1996).      
 
Under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), a defendant who “clearly 
demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense” is 
entitled to a 2-level reduction to his calculated offense level. 2   
The defendant, however, must show by a preponderance of 
the evidence that s/he is entitled to this reduction.  United 
States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 193 (3d Cir. 2002).  Moreover, 
in assessing whether a defendant has adequately accepted 
responsibility, the district court “has the obligation to assess 
the totality of the situation.”  United States v. Cohen, 171 
F.3d 796, 806 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted) (emphasis added).    
 
Harris claims he did everything he could to 
demonstrate acceptance of responsibility.  According to 
Harris, he had to plead nolo contendere rather than guilty 
                                              
2  In his brief, Harris mentions that, in addition to the 2-level 
reduction under § 3E1.1(a), he expected a 1-level reduction 
under § 3E1.1(b).  To qualify for a § 3E1.1(b) reduction, 
however, the defendant must first qualify for a 2-level 
reduction under § 3E1.1(a).  The government must also 
submit a motion “stating that the defendant has assisted 
authorities . . . by timely notifying [them] of his intention to 
enter a plea of guilty thereby permitting the government to 
avoid preparing for trial and . . . allocate their resources 
efficiently.”  Since we agree that Harris did not qualify for a § 
3E1.1(a) reduction, and the government did not submit the 
requisite motion, Harris is ineligible for this 1-level reduction.  
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because he was so “high” from ingesting alcohol and 
controlled substances that he simply could not remember the 
events of the night in question.  Nevertheless, he argues that 
he told the truth and immediately accepted responsibility for 
his actions, and should therefore have been afforded the 
benefit of a reduced offense level.   He argues that he should 
not be forced to perjure himself by admitting to actions under 
oath that he could not remember in order to receive the 
benefit of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.  Although we do not disagree, 
Harris’s argument ignores the circumstances surrounding his 
plea.         
 
The district court found Harris’s statements that he 
could not recall the evening in question credible, and we 
therefore do not doubt that Harris simply could not recall the 
circumstances leading to his arrest to the extent required to 
admit his conduct under oath.  We are not unsympathetic to 
Harris’s claim that he should not be lured into perjury in order 
to admit to conduct that he simply cannot remember.  
Nevertheless, on this record, we are not prepared to say that 
the district court committed clear error in concluding that 
Harris was not sufficiently remorseful to receive the benefit 
of  U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.   
 
The district court was in a unique position to assess his 
sincerity, and “we are  especially deferential to [its] 
assessment of whether the defendant accepted responsibility.”  
United States v. Williams, 344 F.3d 365, 379 (3d Cir. 2003); 
see also U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. 5.  Here, the district court was 
able to carefully evaluate Harris’s demeanor prior to 
imposing this sentence.  During Harris’s change of plea 
hearing, the district court observed Harris’s demeanor as the 
court viewed the surveillance video from the bar.  The district 
court could also observe Harris as the video played in court.  
Even though Harris did not remember his actions in the bar, 
he saw what he did.  Although we certainly do not expect him 
to admit to something he did not remember just so that he 
could “game the system” into giving him a reduction under 
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, Harris’s claim of clear error ignores the 
fact that the district court could draw certain conclusions from 
Harris’s reaction to the surveillance video.  The court 
concluded that, even though he could not then remember his 
actions in the bar, his demeanor when confronted with the 
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video suggested an absence of remorse for what he saw.  
Even if his conduct did not endanger anyone in the bar – a 
rather dubious proposition that we will accept for purposes of 
argument – he clearly placed the people in the bar in fear of 
imminent harm.   
 
We are simply not prepared to say that it was clearly 
erroneous for the district court to conclude that Harris’s 
reaction to that video was inconsistent with an expression of 
remorse for the conduct depicted.   Despite Harris’s 
arguments to the contrary, this situation is simply not the 
same as penalizing him for his inability to recall his conduct 
that night, and we cannot agree that he received a greater 
sentence because he refused to perjure himself and admit to 
conduct he did not remember.  The district court closely and 
carefully assessed the totality of the situation, and there is no 
clear error.    
III. 
 
Harris also argues that the district court erred by 
applying U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) and 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) to 
his sentence.   We “review factual findings relevant to the 
[Sentencing] Guidelines for clear error.”  United States v. 
Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007).  A district court’s 
‘“finding is clearly erroneous when . . . the reviewing body on 
the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  United States 
v. Ali, 508 F.3d 136, 143 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Concrete 
Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust 
for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993)).   
A. 
 
Under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), a defendant incurs a 
4-level enhancement if the district court finds that he “[u]sed 
or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with 
another felony offense.”  In making this determination, the 
district court applies a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.  United States v. West, 643 F.3d 102, 104-05 (3d 
Cir. 2011).   
 
Here, the district court found by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Harris committed simple assault in violation 
of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2701(a)(3) by placing patrons in 
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the bar in fear of imminent bodily injury with his actions.   
Harris argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish 
that he committed simple assault.  Specifically, Harris 
contends that the video recordings demonstrated that he only 
possessed and brandished the firearm.  He claims that is not 
sufficient to constitute simple assault under Pennsylvania law.     
 
The district court noted that although the surveillance 
recording did not have audio, the menacing nature of Harris’s 
actions was established by observing the video.  Moreover, 
the district court listened to recordings of the 911 calls placed 
that night from the bar.  Those recordings included one caller 
affirming that Harris was threatening people in the bar.  The 
district court found that this was sufficient to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Harris’s actions that night 
placed patrons in the bar in fear of imminent bodily injury.  
Thus, we are not left with a “definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed.”  Ali, 508 F.3d at 143.    
B. 
 
Under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A), a defendant incurs a 
2-level enhancement if the district court finds that the 
defendant possessed a stolen firearm.  In making this 
determination, the district court again applies a 
preponderance of the evidence standard.  See Grier, 568 F.3d 
at 567.  
 
Harris claims that the government failed to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the firearm in question 
was stolen.  He claims that the firearm owner, who passed 
away before Harris’s sentencing hearing, would not have 
been a credible witness had he been able to testify at Harris’s 
sentencing.  According to Harris, the firearm owner’s 
purported lack of credibility establishes that the government 
could not prove the firearm was stolen, and therefore the 
district court clearly erred in so finding.   
 
Despite the firearm owner’s possible credibility issues, 
the district court determined that sufficient evidence was 
present to demonstrate the firearm was stolen.  The district 
court carefully examined two reports from the Department of 
Justice that indicated that the firearm was stolen.  The district 
court also pointed out that Harris had not presented any 
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evidence suggesting he had a lawful right to the firearm. The 
district court therefore concluded that the government had 
satisfied its burden. We cannot conclude that the district court 
clearly erred in applying this enhancement. 
 
IV. 
 
Nor did the district court commit procedural or 
substantive error by denying Harris’s request for a downward 
variance based on his mental-health.  On review of a district 
court’s sentencing decision, “[w]e must first ensure that the 
district court committed no significant procedural error in 
arriving at its decision.”  United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 
217 (3d Cir. 2008).  This review is for abuse of discretion.  Id.  
If the district court has committed no substantial procedural 
error, “we then review the substantive reasonableness of the 
sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”  Id. at 218.     
 
Procedural errors include “failing to calculate (or 
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the 
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) 
factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, 
or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.”  United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).   
 
Here, although not explicitly alleged by Harris, the 
only procedural error he could attempt to argue is that the 
court did not properly consider all of the factors contained in 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Although we do not suggest the district 
court did fail to adequately consider § 3553(a), Harris seems 
to argue that the court failed to adequately consider the 
“history and characteristics of the defendant” under § 
3553(a)(1) by failing to sufficiently consider his mental 
health history and background.    
 
Harris asserted that his alcohol and drug problems 
were a significant part of his mental health issues.  The 
district court correctly found that substance abuse problems, 
without more, do not necessarily justify a downward variance 
under the Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4. The district court 
also considered, but rejected, a downward variance based on 
U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3.  The court concluded that Harris’s case 
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was not sufficiently extraordinary to warrant a departure 
based on this provision.  See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3.  Accordingly, 
the district court committed no procedural error.           
 
Harris’s sentence was also substantively reasonable.  
Substantive review of a district court’s sentence “requires us 
not to focus on one or two factors, but on the totality of the 
circumstances.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.  Due to the district 
court’s unique position as the sentencing court, “[w]e may not 
reverse [it] simply because we would have imposed a 
different sentence.”  Wise, 515 F.3d at 218.  Indeed, we “will 
affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have 
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 
the reasons the district court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 
568.  Here, in imposing the statutory maximum sentence on 
Harris, the district court adequately considered all of the § 
3553(a) factors.  Accordingly, there is no reason to conclude 
that the sentence was unreasonable. See id. (“[A]bsent any 
significant procedural error, we must give ‘due deference to 
the district court’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors, on 
a whole,’ justify the sentence.” (citation omitted)).   
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the district court’s 
sentence.    
  
